# INTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT FORTHEEASTERNDISTRICTOFPENNSYLVANIA

JOHNSCIOTTOandCATHERINEP. : CIVILACTION

SCIOTTOonbehalfofLOUIS :

SCIOTTO,aMinor,ashisparents : andnaturalguardians, :

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

:

MARPLENEWTOWNSCHOOLDISTRICT, :

JAMESSMITH,STUNATHANS,and : GREGFENDLER. :

:

**Defendant.** : **NO.98-2768** 

## **MEMORANDUM**

Reed,S.J. October13,1999

BeforetheCourtisthemotionofthePennsylvaniaSchoolBoardsAssociationInsurance
Trust("Trust")toparticipate namicuscuriae. Insupportofitsmotion,theTruststatesthatit
"providesnumerousinsurancerelatedservicesforandonbehalfofpublicschoolentitiesinthe
CommonwealthofPennsylvania,includingschooldistricts..."Motion,at¶2;thatitparticipates
regularlyinlitigationasapartyoramicus, seeMotion,at¶4;thatcounselfortheTrustisan
expertininsuranceasitrelatestopublicschoolentities, seeMotion,at¶5;andthattheTrust
"canprovidethecourtwithinsightsastohowthiscasemayimpactpublicschoolsandthe
insurancemarketplaceforschooldistricts," seeMotion,at¶6.

## II. ANALYSIS

Meaning"friendofthecourt," amicuscuriae hashistoricallybeenusedtodescribe"an impartialindividualwhosuggeststheinterpretationandstatusofthelaw,givesinformation concerningit,andwhosefunctionistoadviseinorderthatjusticemaybedone,ratherthanto advocateapointofviewsothatacausemaybewonbyonepartyoranother." Leighv.Engle ,

535F.Supp.418,419(N.D.Ill.1982)(citationomitted). Amiciarenotpartiestothecase, but ratherassist the court by "submitting briefing designed to supplement and assist in cases of general public interest, supplement the efforts of counsel, and draw the court's attention to law that might otherwise escape consideration." Community Association for Restoration of the Environment v. De Ruter Brothers Dairy \_\_,54F.Supp.2d974,975(E.D.Wash.1999) (citations omitted).

"Districtcourtshavebroaddiscretiontoappointamicuscuriae." <u>LibertyLincolnv.Ford</u>

<u>MarketingCorp.</u>,149F.R.D.65,82(D.N.J.1993)(citationsomitted).Amicistatusistypically
grantedwhenthefollowingconditionsarepresent:(1)petitionerhasa"specialinterest"inthe

particularcase, <u>see WasteManagementofPa.v.CityofYork</u> 162F.R.D.34,36(M.D.Pa.

1995);(2)petitioner'sinterestisnotrepresentedcompetentlyoratallinthecase, <u>see Liberty</u>

<u>Lincoln</u>,149F.R.Dat82;(3)theprofferedinformationistimelyanduseful, <u>see Hoptowitv.</u>

<u>Ray</u>,682F.2d1237,1260(9 <sup>th</sup>Cir.1982);and(4)petitionerisnotpartialtoaparticularoutcome

inthecase, <u>see Yipv.Pagano</u>,606F.Supp.1566(D.N.J.1985), <u>but see Hoptowit</u>,682F.2dat

1260("thereisnorule...thatamicibetotallydisinterested").

Applyingthesefourcriteria, it is clear that appointing the Trust amicus curiae in the present case innot appropriate. First, the Trust has failed to demonstrate the particularized kind of "special interest" courts have looked for in amicicases. For instance, in Waste Management, the EPA was granted amicus status because it is sued the administrative order that was at issue in the case, see 162 F.R.D. at 35, and in Yip, which was a defamation action based on statements made before the United States House of Representatives, a micus status was granted to a leader ship group of House members concerned with the historically privileged nature of congressional testimony, see 606 F. Suppat 1567. By contrast, the Trust is merely at rade

associationwithageneralizedinterestinallcasesrelatedtoschooldistrictliabilityand insurance. This is not the kind of special interest that warrants a micus status.

Petitionerfailsthesecondprongaswell,astheinterestsofschoolboardinsurersaremore thanadequatelyrepresented by the school district and its able counsel, Joseph T. Bodell, Esq., who apparently is appointed and compensated by the school district's insurer. The interest of the school district in limiting its liability in the present case is identical to the interest of the Trust in limiting the liability of school districts in general. Counselfor Marple Newtown School District, including Mr. Bodell, and Mark Sereni, general counselfor Marple Newtown School District, are more than competent to represent the interests of the school district and the Trust in this case. If that we renote nough, counselfor the petitioner has already entered an appearance on behalf of Marple Newtown, see Appearance of Michael I. Levin for Defendant Marple Newtown, Document No. 70, (filed April 23, 1999) and thus, Marple Newtown and the Court will be nefit from Mr. Levin's considerable expertise (a description of which forms a large part of the Trust's motion) regardless of the outcome of this motion.

Third, the Trust proffers no particular information to the Court other than its "in sights," Motion, at \$\\$5\$, and "argument from time to time on issues of state wide importance to school district [sic]," Motion, at \$\\$9\$. Petitioner's motion promises nothing more than a briefin support of the Marple Newtown School District's motion for permission to appeal. Petitioner has not satisfied the Court that it will provide any information that the Court will find "useful" or "timely" in this particular case.

Fourth, the petitioner cannot be said to be impartial in the matter before the Court.

Petitioner, as an association of school district in surers, has a specific pecuniary interest in the defendant's perspective in this particular case, and makes no attempt to present itself as a neutral

party. Where "amicirepresent[] business interests that will be ultimately and directly affected by the court's ruling on the substantive matter before it, "amicus participation is not appropriate.

See Yip, 606F. Supp. at 1568. While it is acknowledged that partiality of amiciis not dispositive, it is "afactor to consider indeciding whether to allow participation."

Waste

Management, 162F.R.D. at 36. It is apparent to this Court that the petitioner is better characterized as "amicus reus," or friend of the defendant, than amicus curiae.

See Leigh, 535

F. Supp. at 422.

Onamoregeneralnote, petitioner's potential contributions to the case would come largely at the policy level—as stated in its motion, the Trust will contribute its "unique perspective" on the "significant effect [of this case] on all publics choolen tities and on the insurance market place." Motion at ¶7. While policy arguments are certainly interesting and perhaps helpful at the appellate level, they are not the currency of a trial court. If policy arguments are to be the Trust's only contribution to this case, then the judicial process is better served if the Trust did not contribute at the district court level.

Basedontheforegoinganalysis, Icannotconclude in mydiscretion that petitioner has satisfied the requirements for participation as a micuscuriae. Accordingly, the motion of the Pennsylvania School Boards Association Insurance Trust will be denied.

AnappropriateOrderfollows.

#### INTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT

 $<sup>^{1}</sup> In its petition, the Trust states that it disagrees with this Court's holding on defendants' motions for summary judgment, <math display="block">\underline{see} Motion, at \P7, agrees with Marple Newtown's arguments in support of its motion for permission to appeal the court's order, <math display="block">\underline{see} \underline{id}. at \P8. Furthermore, petitioner's draft order states that the Trust will participate "in support of the Marple Newtown School District." Id.$ 

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## ORDER

ANDNOW ,this13thdayofOctober1999,uponconsiderationofthemotionofthe

PennsylvaniaSchoolBoardsAssociationInsurancetrusttoparticipateasamicuscuriae

(DocumentNo.130) andplaintiffs'responsethereto(DocumentNo.135),andhavingconcluded, inmydiscretion,thatpetitioner'sparticipation asamicuscuriaewouldnotbeappropriateor helpfultotheCourt,itishereby ORDERED thatpetitioner'smotionis DENIED.

LOWELLA.REED,JR.,S.J.